Columbus Board of Education v. Penick by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-134 
Columbus Board of Education et al.,) 
Applicants, 
V. 
Gary L. Penick et al. 
On Application for Stay. 
[August 11, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
The Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education and the Superin-
tendent of the Columbus Public Schools request that I stay 
execution of the judgment and the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending considera-
tion by this Court of their petition for certiorari. The judg-
ment at issue affirmed findings of systemwide violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the part of the Columbus Board of Education. and upheld 
an extensive school desegregation plan for the Columbus 
school system. The remedy will require reassignment of 
42,000 students, alteration of the grade organization of almost 
every elementary school in the Columbus system, the closing 
of 33 schools, reassignment of teachers, staff and administra-
tors, and the transportation of over 37,000 students. The 
1978- 1979 school year begins on September 7, and the appli-
cants maintain that failure to stay immediately the judgment 
and ma.ndate of the Court of Appeals will cause immeasurable 
and irreversible harm to the school system and the commu-
nity. The respondents a.re individual plaintiffs and a plain-
tiff class consisting of all children attending Columbus public 
schools, together with their parents and guardians. 
This stay application comes to me after extensive and com-
plicated litigation. On March 8, 1977, the District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio issued an opinion declaring the 
2 COLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK 
Columbus school system unconstitutionally segregated and 
ordering the defendants to develop and submit proposals for 
a systemwide remedy. That decision predated this Court's 
opinions in three important school desegregation cases: Day-
ton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977); 
Brennan v. Armstrong, 43B U. S. 672 (1977); and School Dis-
trict of Omaha v. United States, 433 U. S. 667 (1977). In the 
lrad case, Dayton, t.his Court held that when fashioning a 
remedy for constitutional violations by a school board. the 
court "must determine how much incremental segregative 
effrct these violations had on the racial distribution of the ... 
school population as prf'sently constituted, when that distribu-
tion is compared to what it would have been in the absence of 
such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed 
to redress that difference. and only if there has been a system-
wide impact may there be a systemwide ren10cly." 433 U. S .. 
at 420. The defendants movecl that the District Court recon-
sider its violation findings and adjust its remf'dial order in 
light of our Dayton opinion. Upon such reconsideration, the· 
District Court concluded that Dayton simply restated tho es-
tablished precept that the remerly must not exceed the scope 
of the violation. Since it had found a systemwide violation, 
the District Court clermed a systemwide remedy appropriate 
"·ithout the specific findings mandated by Dayton on the 
impact discrete segregative acts had on tho racial composition 
of individual schools within tho syskm. The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed. Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, Nos. 77-
3365-3366, 3490-3491. and 3553 (July 14. 1978). 
Prior to its submission to me, this application for stay was 
denied. by MR. JusTICE STEWART. While I am naturally 
reluctant to take action in this matter different from that 
taken by him. this case has como to me in a special context. 
Four days before the application for ~tay was filed in this 
Court. tho Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the Dayton 
remand. Brinkman v. Gilligan (Dayton IV), No. 78-3060' 
(July 27, 1978). Pursuant to this Court's opinion in Dayton, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had held 
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a new evidentiary hearing on the scope of any constitutional 
violations by the Dayton school board and the appropriate 
remedy with regard to those violations. It had concluded 
that Dayton required a finding of segre~ative intent with re-
spect to each violation and a remedy drawn to correct the 
incremental segregative impact of each violation. On that 
basis the District Court had found no constitutional violations 
and had dismissed the complaint. The Sixth C'ircuit reversed, 
characterizin~ as a "misunderstanding" the District Court's 
readin~ of our Dayton opinion. Dayton IV, supra, slip. op., 
at 4. It reinstated the systemwide remedy that it had ori~i­
nallv affirmed in Brinkman v. GilligGJn. (Dayton lll), 539 F. 
2d 1084 (1976). vacated and remanded, 433 U. S. 406 (1977). 
Dayton IV and the instant case clearly indicate to me that 
the Sixth Circuit has misinterpreted the mandate of this 
Court's Dayton opinion. During the Term of the C'ourt, I 
would refer the appli.ra.tion for a stay in a case as significant 
as this one to the full Court. But that is impossible here. 
The opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
total almost 200 pages of somP complexity. Tt would be im-
practicable for me to even informally circula.rize my collea~ues, 
with an opportunity for meaningful analysis. within the time 
necessary to act. if the applicants are to be afforded any relief 
and the Columbus community's expectations adjusted for the 
coming school year. 
I am of the opinion that thr Sixth Circuit in this case 
evinced an unduly grudging application of Dayton. Simply 
the fact that throo Justices of this Court might agree with me 
would not necessarily mea.n that the petition for certiorari 
would be granted. But this case cannot be considered without 
reference to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Dayton IV. In 
both cases the Court of Appeals employed legal presumptions 
of intent to extrapolate systemwide violations from what was 
described in the Columbus case as "isolated" instances. 
Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, supra, slip op., at 36 
(July 14, 1978). The Sixth Circuit is apparently of the 
opinion that presumptions, in combination with such isolated 
'. 
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violations, can be used to justify a. system,vide remedy where 
such a. remedy would not be warranted by the incremental 
segregative affect of the identified violations. That is cer-
tainly not my reading of Dayton and appears inconsistent 
with this Court's decision to vacate and remand the Sixth 
Circuit's opinion in Dayton III. In my opinion, this ques-
tionable use of legal presumptions, combined with the fact 
that the Dayton and Columbus cases involve transportation 
of over 52,000 school children, would lead four Justices of this 
Court to vote to grant certiorari in at least one case and hold 
thf' other in abeyance until disposition of the first. 
On the basis of the District Court's findings, some relief 
may be justified in this case under the principles laid clown 
in Dayton. Two instances where the school system set UP' 
cliscontiguous attendance areas that resulted in white children 
being transported past predominantly black schools ma.y be· 
clear violations wananting relief. But the failure of the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals to make any findings 
on the incremental segrega.tive effect of these viola.tions make-
it impossible for me to tailor a stay to allow the applicants a~ 
more limited form of relief. 
In their response, the plaintiffs/respondents also take an 
"all or nothing" approach and do not offer any suggestions 
as to how the mandate and judgment of the Court of Appeals 
can be stayed only in part consistent with the a.pplicants' 
legal contentions. I therefore have no recourse but to grant 
or deny the stay of the mandate and judgment in its entirety. 
The last inquiry in gauging the appropriateness of a stay 
is the balance of equities. If the stay is granted the respond-
ent-children's opportunity for a more integrated educational 
experience is forestalled. How many children and how inte-
grated an educational experience are impossible to discern be-
cause of the failure of the courts below to inquire how the 
complexion of the school system was affected by specific 
violations. 
In contrast, the impact of the failure to grant a sta.y on the 
applicants is quite concrete. Extensive prepa.rations toward' 
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implementation of the desegregation plan have taken place, 
but an affidavit filed in this Court by the Superintendent of 
the Columbus Public Schools indicates that major activities 
remain for the four weeks before the new school term begins. 
These activities include inventory, packing, and moving of 
furniture, textbooks, equipment and supplies; completion of 
pupil reassignments, bus routes and schedules, and staff and 
administrative reassignments; construction of bus storage and 
maintenance facilities; hiring and training of new bus drivers; 
and notification to parents of pupil reassignments and bus 
information. Such a-Ctivities cannot be easily reversed. Most 
important, on September 7 there will occur the personal dis-
locations that accompany the actual reassignment of 42,000 
students, 37,000 of which ·will be transported by bus. 
The Columbus school system has severe financial difficulties. 
It is estimated tha.t for calendar year 1978 the system will 
have a cash deficit of $9.5 million , $7.3 million of which is 
calculated to be desegregation expe11ses. Under Ohio law 
school districts are not permitted to operate when cash bal-
ances fall to zero and it is now projected tha.t the Columbus 
school system will be forced to close in mid-November of 1978. 
Fina.ncial exigency is not an excuse for failure to comply with 
a court order, but it is a relevant consideration in balancing 
the equities of a temporary stay. 
Given the severe burdens that the school desegregation order 
will place on the Columbus school system and the Columbus 
community in general, and the likelihood that four Justices 
of this Court will vote to gra.nt certiorari in this case, I have 
decided to grant the stay of the judgment and mandate of 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
As this Court noted in Dayton, "local autonomy of school 
districts is a vital national tradition." 433 U. S., at 410. 
School desegregation orders are among the most sensitive en-
croachments on that tradition, not only because they affect 
the assignment of pupils and teachers, but also because they 
often restructure the system of education. In this case the 
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tion of virtually every elementary school in Columbus. As 
this Court emphasized in Dayton, judicial imposition on this 
established province of the community is only proper in the 
face of factual proof of constitutional violations and then only 
to the extent necessary to remedy the effect of those violations. 
It is therefore ordered that the application for a stay of 
the judgments and mandates of the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio be granted pending consideration of a timely petition 
for certiorari. The stay is to remain in effect until disposi-
tion of the petition for certiorari. If the petition is granted, 
the stay shall remain in effect until further order of this Court. 
i'upumt <qomi cf t~t ~lt i>tatt.s 
~rullfingron. ~. QJ. 2ll.?JI.~ · 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
August 25, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: A-134 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick 
Several of the Brethren suggested that some kind of 
"terminal" order be entered in this case. I deferred action 
to allow ample time for everyone to respond. Since I am 
taking off tomorrow until September 20 I did not act until 
this mornin~having asked the Clerk to prepare an appropriate 
order. That order was signed this forenoon. 
At 3:46p.m., 4:13p.m. and 4:24p.m. I received memos 
from John, Bill Brennan and Potter, respectively: John 
voted to grant the petition for a Special Term, Bill asked 
"that the order not be released until I have had an opportunity 
to review its form," and Potter requested that the order not 
include his name as an abstention or a dissenter. The memo 
from his clerk states, " ... it is his belief that that will 
not involve mentioning his name as a member of the majority. 
He does vote, however, to deny the special term." 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Dayton Board of Education, 
Applicant, 
v. 
Mark Brinkman, et al. 
No. A-212 
On Application for Stay 
I August 28, 1978] 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, Circuit Justice. 
The Dayton, Ohio Board of Education requests that I 
stay execution of the judgment and mandate of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending consideration 
by the Court of its petition for certiorari. The judgment re-
versed the dismissal by the district court of the plaintiffs' 
school desegregation suit, and ordered the extensive desegre-
gation plan continued. 
The applicant urges that this case be stayed because 
it raises many of the issues presented by Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stayed the mandate 
of the Sixth Circuit in that case on August 11, 1978. A 
crucial distinction between these cases leads me to believe 
that this application should be denied. Columbus had never 
been the subject of a school desegregation remedy; the Dayton 
system, by contrast, will enter its third year under the cur-
rent plan on September 7. In Columbus the status quo was pre-
served by granting a stay; here it can be preserved only by 
denying one. To avoid disrupting the school system during our 
consideraton of the case, the stay should be denied. This dis-
position, of course, does not reflect any view on the merits 
of the issues presented 
The application for a stay of the judgment and mandate 




.:§u:puntt ~!l"Url .o-f f4t ~b .:§bUts. 
Jfas~ ~. Qj. 2.0~'!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
August 28, 1978 
Re: A-134, Columbus Board of Education 
v. Penick 
Dear Chief, 
This will confirm that I am opposed 
to the calling of a Special Term to consider 
the application of the respondent. 
I have authorized my secretary, Mrs. 




The Chief Justice 







SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-134 
Columbus Board of Education et al., 
Applicants, 
v. 
Gary L. Penick et al. 
On Application for Stay. 
[August 11, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
The Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education and the Superin-
tendent of the Columbus Public Schools request that I stay 
execution of the judgment and the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending considera-
tion by this Court of their petition for certiorari. The judg-
ment at issue affirmed findings of systemwide violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the part of the Columbus Board of Education, and upheld 
an extensive school desegregation plan for the Columbus 
school system. The remedy will require reassignment of 
42,000 students, alteration of the grade organization of almost 
every elementary school in the Columbus system. the closing 
of 33 schools, reassignment of teachers, staff and administra-
tors, and the transportation of over 37,000 students. The· 
1978-1979 school year begins on September 7, and the appli-
cants maintain that failure to stay immediately the judgment 
and mandate of the Court of Appea.Is will cause immeasurable 
and irreversible harm to the school system and the commu-
nity. The respondents are individual plaintiffs and a plain-
tiff class consisting of all children attending Columbus public 
schools, together with their parents and guardians. 
This stay application comes to me after extensive and com-
plicated litigation. On March 8, 1977, the District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio issued an opinion decla.ring the 
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Columbus school system unconstitutionally segregated and 
ordering the defendants to develop and submit proposals for 
a systemwide remedy. That decision predated this Court's 
opinions in three important school desegregation cases: Day-
ton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( 1977); 
Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U. S. 672 (1977); and School Dis-
trict of Omaha v. United States, 433 U. S. 667 (1977). In the 
lead case, Dayton, t.his Court held that when fashioning a 
remedy for constitutional violations by a school board, the 
court "must determine how much incremental segregative 
effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the ... 
school popula.tion as presently constituted, when that distribu-
tion is compared to what it would have been in the absence of 
snch constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed 
to redress that difference, and only if there has been a system-
wide impact may there be a systemwide remedy." 433 U. S., 
at 420. The defendants moved that the District Court recon-
sider its violation finding and adjust its remedial order in ~ 
light of our Dayton opinion. Upon such reconsideration, the-
District Court concluded that Dayton simply restated the <'S-
tahlished precept that the remedy must not <:'xcced the scope 
of the violation. Since it had found a systemwide violation, 
the District Court deemed a systemwide remedy appropriate 
'Yithout the specific findings mandated by Dayton on the 
impact discrete segregative acts had on the racial composition 
of individual schools within the system. The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed. Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, Nos. 77-
3365-3366, 3490-3491, and 3553 (July 14. Hl78). 
Prior to its submission to me, this application for stay was 
denied by MR. JusTICE STEWART. While I am naturally 
reluctant to take action in this matter different from that 
taken by him, this case has come to me in a special context. 
Four days before the application for stay was filed in this 
Court. the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the Dayton 
remand. Brinkman v. Gilligan (Dayton IV). No. 78-3060 
(July 27, 1978). Pursuant to this Court's opinion in Dayton, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had held 
·-
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a new evidentiary hearing on the scope of any constitutional 
violations by the Dayton school board and the appropriate 
remedy with regard to those violations. It had concluded 
that Dayton required a finding of segregative intent with re-
spect to each violation and a remedy drawn to correct the 
incremental se~egative impact of each violation. On that 
basis the District Court had found no constitutional violations 
and had dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed, 
characterizing as a "misunderstanding" the District Court's 
reading of our Dayton opinion. Dayton IV, supra, slip. op., 
at 4. It reinstated the systemwirle remedy that it had origi-
nally affirmed in Brinkman v. Gilligam (Dayton III). 539 F. 
2d 1084 (1976). vacated and remanded. 433 U. S. 406 (1977). 
Dayton IV and the instant case clearly indicate to me that 11 
the Sixth Circuit has misinterpreted the mandate of this 
Court's Dayton opinion. During the Term of thf' C'ourt, I 
would refer the application for a stay in a case as significant 
as this one to the full Court. But that is impossible here. 
The opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
total almost 200 pages of some complexity. It would be im-
practicable for me to even informally circularize my colleagues, 
with an opportunity for meaningful analysis, within the time 
necessary to act if the applicants are to be afforded any relief 
and the Columbus community's expectations adjusted for the 
coming school year. 
I am of the opinion that the Sixth Circuit in this case 
evinced an unduly grudging application of Dayton. Simply 
the fact that three Justices of this Court might agree with me 
would not necessarily mean that the petition for certiorari 
would be granted. But this case cannot be considered without 
reference to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Dayton IV. In 
both cases the Court of Appeals employed legal presumptions 
of intent to extrapolate systemwide violations from what was 
described in the Columbus case as "isolated" instances. 
Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, supra, slip op., at 36 
(July 14, 1978). The Sixth Circuit is apparently of the 
opinion that presumptions, in combination with such isolated 
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violations, can be used to justify a systemwide remedy where 
such a remedy n·ou1d not be warranted by the incremental 
segregative Atrect of the identified violations. That is cer-
tainly not my rearling of Dayton and appears inconsistent 
with this Court's decision to vacate and remand the Sixth 
Circuit's opinion in Dayton III. In my opinion, this ques-
tionable use of legal presumptions, combined with the fact 
that the Dayton and Columbus cases involve transportation 
of over 52,000 school children, would lead four Justices of this 
Court to vote to grant certiorari in at least one case and hold 
the other in abeyance until disposition of the first. 
On the basis of the District Court's findings, some relief 
ma.y be justified in this case under the principles laid down 
in Dayton. Two instances where the school system set up 
discontiguous attendance areas tha.t resulted in white children 
being transported past predominantly bla.ck schools may be 
clear violations warranting relief. But the failure of the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals to make any findings 
on the incremental segregative effect of these violations make 
it impossible for me to tailor a stay to allow the applicants a' 
more limited form of relief. 
In their response. the plaintiffs/ respondents also take an 
"all or nothing" approach and do not offer any suggestions 
as to how the mandate and judgment of the Court of Appeals 
can be stayed only in part consistent with the applicants'· 
legal contentions. I therefore have no recourse but to grant 
or deny the stay of the mandate and judgment in its entirety. 
The last inquiry in gauging the appropria.teness of a stay 
is the balance of equitjes. If the stay is granted the respond-
ent-children's opportunity for a more integrated educational 
experience is forestalled. How many children and how inte-
grated an educational experience are impossible to discern be-· 
cause of the failure of the courts below to inquire how the 
complexion of the school system was affected by specific 
violations. 
In contrast, the impact of the failure to grant a stay on the 
applicants is quite concrete. Extensive prepa.rations toward 
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implementation of the desegregation plan have taken place, 
but an affidavit filed in this Court by the Superintendent of 
the Columbus Public Schools indicates that major activities 
remain for the four weeks before the new school term begins. 
Those activities include inventory, packing, and moving of 
furniture, textbooks, equipment and supplies; completion of 
pupil reassignments, bus routes and schedules, and staff a.nd 
administrative reassignments; construction of bus storage and 
maintenance facilities; hiring and training of new bus drivers; 
and notification to parents of pupil reassignments and bus 
information. Such activities cannot be easily reversed. Most 
important, on September 7 there will occur the personal dis-
locations that accompany the actual reassignment of 42,000 
students, 37,000 of which will be transported by bus. 
The Columbus school system has severe financial difficulties. 
It is estimated that for calenda.r year 1978 the system will 
have a cash deficit of $9.5 mi11ion, $7.3 million of which is 
calculated to be desegregation expenses. Under Ohio law 
school districts are not permitted to operate when cash bal-
ances fall to zero and it is now projected that the Columbus 
school system will be forced to close in mid-November of 1978. 
Financial exigency is not an excuse for failure to comply with 
a court order, but it is a relevant consideration in balancing 
the equities of a temporary stay. 
Given the severe burdens that the school desegregation order 
will place on the Columbus school system a.nd the Columbus 
community in general, and the likelihood that four Justices 
of this Court will vote to gra.nt certiorari in this case, I have 
decided to grant the stay of the judgment and mandate of 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
As this Court noted in Dayton, "local autonomy of school 
districts is a vital national tradition." 433 U. S. , at 410. 
School desegregation orders are among the most sensitive en-
croachments on that tradition , not only because they affect 
the assignment of pupils and teachers, but also because they 
often restructure the system of education. In this case the 
desegregation order requires alteration of the grade organiza-
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tion of virtually every elementary school in Columbus. As 
this Court emphasized in Dayton, judicial imposition on this 
established province of the community is only proper in the 
face of factual proof of constitutional violations and then only 
to the extent necessary to remedy the effect of those violations. 
It is therefore ordered that the application for a stay of 
the judgments and mandates of the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio be granted pending consideration of a timely petition 
for certiorari. The stay is to remain in effect until disposi-
tion of the petition for certiorari. If the petition is granted, 
the stay shall remain in effect until further order of this Court. 
C HAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§u.prtnu '!t01trt1tf tfrt ~tb .§tides 
~aslpttgLm, ~. "t· 20.?'1~ 
August 15, 1978 
Re: No. A-134 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick 
Dear Chief: 
The application of the respondents in this case to set 
aside or vacate the stay I entered last Friday of the Sixth Cir-
cuit's mandate appears to seek that relief from an individual 
Justice or, if that is not determined to be within the authority 
of an individual Justice (see app. p. 10), from a Special Term 
of the full Court. Potter told me yesterday evening that he had 
just denied the application. Since it is my stay order that is 
challenged, I do not think it inappropriate for me to express 
my views on these two alternative avenues for overturning my 
order. 
It is my understanding that no single Justice (even the Chief 
Justice!) may vacate or set aside a stay granted by another 
Justice, and that such action may be taken only by the full Court 




Term. This is the only way that the written "dialogue" between 
Thurgood and Bill Douglas in the case where a stay was sought 
of the District Court's order forbidding the Cambodia bombing, 
which arose during the Summer of 1973 (reported at 414 U.S. 1304-
. ' 
1326), makes any sense. Thurgood originally refused to stay an 
order of the CA 2 which had in turn stayed the order of the Distric-t, 
Court. The applican~ who had prevailed in the District Court, 
then went to Bill Douglas, who did stay the order of CA 2. The 
government then returned to Thurgood seeking from him a stay of 
the order of the DC, which would obviously have the same effect 
as a denial of the stay of the CA 2 order, but was nonetheless a 
-~ 
different request with regard to a different order. Thurgood 
grqnted the government's request after telephonic consultation 
with other members of the Court. Bill then filed a dissenting 
opinion saying that only the full Court had authority to set aside 
his order, since he thought he had not only st~yed the order of 
CA 2 but had affirmatively directed that the order of the District 
court be carried out. 
I have no doubt that this is the present and correct state 
of the law with respect to the authority of an individual Justice 




Justice. An opposite conclusion would lead to a chaotic situation, 
in which one Justice could grant a stay, a second Justice set his 
stay aside, the first Justice then reinstate the stay, etc. I 
think this understanding of the authority of an individual Justice 
to set aside a stay is quite consistent with what I understand to 
be the authority of an individual Justice to grant a stay which 
has been earlier denied by another individual Justice. That, of 
course, is what I did in this case, and it is my understanding 
that an applicant for a stay may go from Justice to Justice, and 
that even though he is turned down by eight of the nine Members 
of the Court, the ninth member nonetheless has the authority to 
grant it. Obviously, for a ninth Justice to go in the teeth of 
the recorded views of his eight Brethren would smack of arrogance, 
but that goes to the question of the wisdom of the action rather 
than the authority for it. 
As ta the second question raised by the respondents• appli-
cation -- the convening of a Special Term of the Court to consider 
their motion to vacate my stay -- my recollection of the conference 
discussion at the time of the Special Term called during the 
Summer of 1972 to consider the Democratic National Committee cases 
is that there was some difference of opinion among us as to who 
- 4 -
has the authority to convene such a Term. Assuming that the 
views of a majority of the individual Justices of the Court are 
relevant, if not controlling, I am opposed to the calling of a 
Special Term to consider this application. 
I have dictated this letter by telephone and had it read 
back to me, but since I am out of the City I have authorized 
Bob Haar, one of my law clerks, to sign my initials to it. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ ,,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
$>nprtmt QJlllttt ttf f4t ~h .§fa±ts 
:w~s!yhtgtttn, !'). <!f. 2.0gilt.;l 
August 17, 1978 




I returned to Washington late last evening 
and saw your memo of August 15. 
Reading it I assume you were proceeding in the 
belief that all of us had the papers received August 14 
entitled "Motion to Vacate Stay by Single Justice, 
etc." 
I find that Motion was not circulated but I 
sought it from the Clerk and find that the face of the 
Motion is not all that accurate in describing the 
"Relief Requested" which appears on p.7 where petitioners 
open stating: 
"Plaintiffs respectfully ask the 
Circuit Justice to circulate this Motion 
and the attached papers to the full Court." 
This is followed by extended discussion which hardly 
clarified the situation. The confusion seems to have 
arisen from the entitlement of the Motion on the face 
and the expanded discussion beginning at page 7. 
As I now read the whole document petitioners were 
in fact asking only that the matter of a stay be referred 
to the full Court in some way or that a Special Term be 
called. 
Potter apparently acted on the assumption that 
the relief sought was to "VACATE [the] STAY" granted by 
Bill Rehnquist and accordingly he denied it -- and I 
think correctly. Justices cannot get involved in a con-





In light of Bill's memo of August 15, I see 
nothing to do at this s.tage. 
It has not been necessary for me to resolve 
whether the Chief Justice has power to convene a 
Special Term or whether it can be done only by the 
Court. There is no need to resolve that issue here 
although I have no hesitation in expressing my view 
that the Chief Justice has that authority. Having 
said that I add that it might be futile unless the 
"convenor" was reasonably sure five other Justices 
would show up. However, since I would not undertake 
to exercise the authority which I believe exists except 
on a matter of significant national concern, I have 
no doubt a quorum would respond. The circularity 
of this approach will be apparent, but should there 
be a different appraisal among the Justfues as to the 
importance of the question presented, I suspect any 
Chief Justice who felt strongly on the need for a 
Special Term would be content to let the absent Brothers 
justify their absence. I regard the matter as largely 
academic and have consulted everyone in the situations 
presented since June 1969. 
In short, I see no problem now but conceivably 
one could be presented if a new motion is filed asking 
me to present the petition to the full Court, or 
alternatively, to convene a Special Term. I would 
readily comply with the former and deny the latter, 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 







JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. 
jSu:pr tntt <!Jcurl cf tfrt ~b jShrlt.S' 
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August 22, 1978 
Re: A-134 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I first learned this noon of the filing of the application 
supported by the Solicitor General to convene a Special Session 
of the Court to review Bill Rehnquist's stay. I also learned 
from my chambers that the Chief, Byron, Harry and Lewis have 
circulated memos that each would deny the request. There has 
been no official word from Potter, Thurgood, or John. 
Since there are five votes to deny, I see no purpose in my 
examining the papers and I will simply pass. 
I have authorized my clerk, Merrick Garland, to initial 
this memorandum for me. 
Sincerely, 
August 22, 1978 
Dear Chief: 
With respect to the application filed on August 
21 to convene a Special Term to consider- the stay in 
A-134, Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, I would deny 
the request. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 




In my note yesterday, I expressed my opposition 
to convening a Special Term of the Court, as requested by 
respondents in the above case. I understand this is the 
view of at least .a majority of the Brothers. 
I intended to say also that I see no reason for 
an opinion. But I do think it would be desirable, as a 
means of advising the parties, to enter a brief order 
denying the request. 
Perhaps this already has 
~ I understand you will be 
Europe at the end of the week. I hope you and Vera 
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